

## Introduction: Agenda for a Generation

Every generation inherits from the past a set of problems--personal and social--and a dominant set of insights and perspectives by which the problems are to be understood and, hopefully, managed. The critical feature of this generation's inheritance is that the problems are so serious as to actually threaten civilization, while the conventional perspectives are of dubious worth. Horrors are regarded as commonplace; we take universal strife in stride; we treat newness with a normalcy that suggests a deliberate flight from reality.

How can the magnitude of modern problems be best expressed? Perhaps by means of paradox:

With nuclear energy whole cities could easily be powered, but instead we seem likely to unleash destruction greater than that incurred in all wars in human history;

With rockets we are emancipating man from terrestrial limitations, but from Mississippi jails still comes the prayer for emancipation of man on earth;

As man's own technology destroys old and creates new forms of social organization, man still tolerates meaningless work, idleness instead of creative leisure, and educational systems that do not prepare him for life amidst change;

While expanding networks of communication, transportation, integrating economic systems, and the birth of intercontinental missiles make national boundaries utterly permeable and antiquated, men still fight and hate in provincial loyalty to nationalism;

While two-thirds of mankind suffers increasing undernourishment, our upper classes are changing from competition for scarce goods to revelling amidst abundance;

With world population expected to double in forty years, men still permit anarchy as the rule of international conduct and uncontrolled exploitation to govern the sapping of the earth's physical resources;

Mankind desperately needs visionary and revolutionary leadership to respond to its enormous and deeply-entrenched problems. But America rests in national stalemate, her goals ambiguous and tradition-bound when they should be new and far-reaching, her democracy apathetic and manipulated when it should be dynamic and participative.

These paradoxes convey tensions which demand the attention of every individual concerned with the future condition of man. The newness of them demands intellectual self-reliance from a younger generation that fears to be its own leadership. The complexity of them requires a radical sense of appreciation, of facts and values, that few thinkers want to undertake. The dangers in them, that this

is the first generation to know it might be the last in the long experiment at living, call not for detachment and retreat but for humility and initiative, not for hypnotic adoption of the politics of past and ranking orders, but for reflective working out of a politics anew.

We are people of this generation, in our late teens and early- or mid-twenties, bred in affluence, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.

We are dismayed by the timidity of our elders and the privatism of our peers. The organizations we know, in which we are to be socialized as citizens, are unradical, in that they treat only of symptoms, not roots, or unpolitical, in that they are impelled more by outrage and static protest than measured analysis and assertive program, or simply hesitant, skirting the issues and blurring them with rhetoric, rather than admitting of problems both intellectual and political and nevertheless seeking a broad analysis of social issues.

We write, debate, and assert this manifesto, not as a declaration that we have the Final Cure, but to affirm that problems must be faced with an expression of knowledge and value, and in action. In this affirmation we deny that problems can be faced by claiming they don't exist anymore, or that the government through expertise will solve what problems there are.

We do this as a basis for an organization, because as students we feel that only as we find some structured way of working together, sharing ideas, formulating program and engaging in action will the left become visible and responsible in America.

Our form is tentative--it will change as a response to growth, as we extend beyond our own age group--as we find ways to work with those whom the academic structure identifies as our teachers, as bridges can be extended to labor, the church, the liberal reform and socialist political groups, as we form the necessary amalgamations with other liberal and radical centers on the campus and beyond. Our goal is to stimulate a left--new and, we think, young.

We seek to be public, responsible, and influential--not housed in garrets, lunatic, and ineffectual; to be visionary yet ever developing concrete programs--not empty or deluded in our goals and sterile in inaction; to be idealistic and hopeful--not deadened by failures or chained by a myopic view of human possibilities; to be both passionate and reflective--not timid and intellectually paralytic; to vivify American politics with controversy--not to emasculate our principles before the icons of unity and bipartisanship; to stimulate and give honor to the full movement of human imagination--not to induce sectarian rigidity or encourage stereotyped rhetoric.

On this basis we offer this document: as an effort in understanding the new, but an effort rooted in the ancient, still unfulfilled conception of man as a being struggling for determining influence over his circumstances. That man should creatively encounter the forces new and old, challenging his reason and menacing his freedom, is the hope underlying this paper, which is our beginning--in argument, in identifying friends and opponents, and most essentially in carrying on our own education--as democrats in a time of upheaval.

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## The Students

In the last few years, thousands of American students demonstrated that they at least felt the urgency of the times. They moved actively and directly against racial injustices, the threat of war, violations of individual rights of conscience and, less frequently, against economic manipulation. They succeeded in restoring a small measure of controversy to the campuses after the stillness of the McCarthy period. They succeeded, too, in gaining some concessions from the people and institutions they opposed, especially in the fight against racial bigotry.

The significance of these scattered "movements" lies not in their success or failure in gaining objectives—at least not yet. Nor does the significance lie in the intellectual "competence" or "maturity" of the students involved—as some pedantic elders allege. The significance is in the fact that the students are breaking the crust of apathy and overcoming the inner alienation that remain the defining characteristics of American college life.

In truth, student movements for reform are rareties on the campus. What is commonplace on the campus? How do "apathy" and "inner alienation" manifest themselves? The real campus, the familiar campus, is a place of private people, engaged in their notorious "inner emigration". It is a place of commitment to business-as-usual, getting ahead, playing it cool. It is a place of mass affirmation of the Twist, but mass reluctance toward the controversial public stance. Rules are accepted as "inevitable", bureaucracy as "just circumstances", irrelevance as "scholarship", selflessness as "martyrdom", politics as "just another way to make people, and an unprofitable one, too".

According to recent studies, almost no students value being active as a citizen. Passive in public, they are hardly more idealistic in arranging their private lives: Gallup concludes they will "settle for low success and won't risk high failure." There is not much willingness to take risks (not even in business), no setting of dangerous goals, no real conception of personal identity except one made in the image of others, no real urge for personal fulfillment except to be almost as successful as the very successful people. Attention is paid to social status, the quality of shirt collars, meeting people, getting wives or husbands, making solid contacts for later on); much, too, is paid to academic status (grades, honors, the med school rat race). Neglected generally is the intellectual status, the personal cultivation of excellence of the mind.

"Students don't even give a damn about the apathy", one of us has said. Apathy toward apathy begets a privately constructed universe, a place of systematic study schedules, tow nights a week for beer, a girl or two, and early marriage; a framework infused with personality, warmth and under control, no matter how unsatisfying it may be.

Under these conditions, university life loses all relevance to some. Four hundred thousand of us leave college every year.

But apathy and alienation are not simply attitudes; they are products of our social institutions, of the structure and organization of higher education. The extracurricular life is ordered according to in loco parentis theory, which ratifies the Administration as the moral guardian of the young. The accompanying "let's pretend" theory of student extra-curricular affairs transforms student government into a training center for those who want to spend

their lives pretending politically, and discourages initiative from more articulate, honest, and sensitive students. The bounds and style of controversy are delimited before controversy begins. The university "prepares" the student for "citizenship" through perpetual rehearsals and, usually, through evisceration of what creative spirit there is in the individual.

The academic life contains reinforcing counterparts to the way in which extracurricular life is organized. The academic world is founded in a teacher-student relation analogous to the parent-child relation which characterizes in loco parentis. Further, academic life is founded in a radical separation of student from the "object" he studies. That which is studied, the social reality, is "objectified", theory divorced from the stuff of practice, the unity of human understanding submitted to compartmentalizing, specializing, and the quest for little questions. Thus is the student divided from life by his professor, as the anxious administrator attempts to do through in loco parentis.

The academic bureaucracy—the administrators and their pervading systems—extends throughout the academic and extracurricular structures, contributing to the sense of outer complexity and inner powerlessness that transforms so many students from honest searching to ratification of convention and, worse, to a numbness to present and future catastrophes.

Almost invisibly, too, huge foundations and other private financial interests shape the money-hungry universities, making them more commercial, less disposed to diagnose society critically, less open to dissent. Defense contracts, too, bring many universities into tacit cooperation with the interests supporting the arms race. In summary, the actual intellectual effect of the college experience on the student is barely distinguishable from that of any other communications channel—say, a television set—passing on the stock truths of the day. Students leave college somewhat more "tolerant" than others, but basically unchanged in their values and political orientations. This is unsurprising, since the real function of the educational system—as opposed to its more rhetorical function of "searching for truth"—is to impart the key information and styles that will help the student get by, modestly but comfortably, in the big society beyond.

Look beyond the campus, to America itself. That student life is more intellectual, and perhaps more comfortable, does not obscure the fact that the fundamental qualities of life on the campus reflects the habits of society at large. The fraternity president is seen at the junior manager levels; the sorority queen has gone to Grosse Pointe; the serious poet burns hopelessly for a place any place, to work; the once-serious and never-serious poets are at the advertising agencies or the slick magazines. The desperation of people threatened by forces about which they know little and of which they can say less; the cheerful emptiness of people forced to close their identities to modern stress; the hostile surrender of people "giving up" all hope of changing things; the faceless polled by Gallup who listed "international affairs" fourteenth on their list of "problems", but also expected thermonuclear war in the next few years; in these and other forms, Americans are in withdrawal from public life, from any collective effort at directing their own affairs.

Some regard this national doldrums as a sign of healthy approval of the established order—but is it approval by consent or manipulated acquiescence? Others declare that the people are withdrawn because compelling issues are fast disappearing—perhaps there are fewer headlines in America, but is Jim Crow gone, is there enough work and work more fulfilling, is world war a

diminishing threat, and what of the new peoples and their aspirations? Still others think that the national quietude is a necessary consequence of the need for elites to resolve complex and specialized problems of modern industrial society--but, then, why should business elites decide foreign policy, and who controls the elites anyway, and are they solving mankind's problems? Others, finally, shrug knowingly and announce that full democracy never worked anywhere in the past--but why lump qualitatively different civilizations together, and how can a social order work well if its best thinkers are sceptics, and is man really doomed forever to the domination of today?

There are no convincing apologies for the contemporary malaise. While the world tumbles toward the final war, while men in other nations are trying desperately to alter events, while the very future qua future is uncertain-- America is without community impulse, with the inner momentum necessary for an age when societies cannot successfully perpetuate themselves by their military weapons, when democracy must be viable because of its quality of life, not its quantity of rockets.

The apathy here is, first, subjective--the felt powerlessness of ordinary people, the resignation before the enormity of events. But subjective apathy is encouraged by the objective American situation--the actual structural separation of people from power, from relevant knowledge, from the pinnacles of decision-making. Just as the university influences the student way of life, so do major social institutions create the circumstances in which the isolated citizen will try helplessly to understand his world and himself.

The very isolation of the individual--from power and community and ability to aspire--means the rise of a democracy without publics. With the great mass of people structurally remote and psychologically hesitant with respect to democratic institutions, those institutions themselves attenuate and become, in the fashion of the vicious circle, progressively less accessible to those few who aspire to serious participation in social affairs. The vital democratic connection between community and leadership, between the mass and the several elites, has been so wrenched and perverted that disastrous policies go unchallenged time and again.

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## American Politics

Historically and currently, American politics are built on a desire to deploy and neutralize the "evil drives" of men. Paradoxically, they have instead tended to diminish general interest in citizenship and have encouraged the consolidation of irresponsibility at higher levels of government. Politics today are organized for policy paralysis and minority domination, not for fluid change and mass participation. The major parties contain broader differences within them than between themselves. What exists instead of two parties is an undeclared "third party" alliance of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans, blessed by a seniority system that guarantees Congressional committee domination to conservatives (10 of 17 committees in the Senate and 13 of 21 in the House are currently chaired by Southern Democrats). For one hundred years the going bargain has given the liberals the Presidency, the conservatives the Congress, and the general public a system of unrepresentative government. Confusion necessarily is built in to political discussion. Relevant issues are not raised and debated in a way that affords the voter a genuine political choice: politics of personality transcends the politics of issues. Calcification (under the name of "responsible progress with stability") dominates flexibility as the principle of parliamentary organization. Frustration is the expectancy of legislators intending serious liberal reform. In a world demanding rapid change, Congress becomes less and less central in American decision-making -- in foreign policy Congress has but a minor role since World War II.

Outside of Congress, the parties view themselves not as vehicles for debate but as machines seeking power, not as outlets for individual work but as dispensers of rewards and elevators to status. But politics go beyond congressional/flexibility and party power lust. Involved, too, is the expanding force of lobbyists, predominantly representing business interests, spending hundreds of millions annually in a systematic effort to conform facts about our productivity, our agriculture, our defense, our social services, to the interests of private economic groupings.

In this contest of organized stalemate, party contradictions, insulated power and privilege, and deliberate falsifications, the most alarming fact is that few, if any, politicians are calling for a change. Rather than protesting conditions, the politicians aggravate them in several ways.

While in practice they go about rigging public opinion to their own interests, in word and ritual they enshrine "the sovereign public." Their speeches and campaign actions are banal, based in a degrading conception of what people want to hear. They respond not to dialogue, but to pressure: and knowing this, the ordinary citizen feels even greater powerlessness. Perhaps the most criminal of political acts is the trumpeted appeal to "citizenship" and "service to the nation" which, since it is not meant to really rearrange power relations, only increases apathy by opening no creative outlet for real citizenship. Often, too, the appeal to "service" is justified not in terms of idealism, but in the crasser terms of "defending the Free World from Communism"--thus making future idealistic impulses impossible to justify in any but Cold War terms.

## The Economy

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American economic life is not as it once was. Capitalism today advertises itself as the Welfare State. Ours is the first generation to comfortably expect pensions, medical care, unemployment compensations, and other social services throughout our lives. In many places, workers need not experience the sweatshop conditions of the Thirties, the unrepaired machines, the unrestrained bosses. Most of our top unionists have assumed the roles and rhetoric of business leaders--a requisite of good bargaining, of course. Although our productive capacity is one-fourth idle, two-thirds of all Americans make enough to live in utter comfort, were it not for the nagging incentive to "keep up". As they say, we are "making it pretty well".

But we are younger, raised in the Boom of World War II. We take for granted the existence and desirability of the New Deal reforms, and we look with anger at the legacies, the unfinished reforms, of our liberal ancestors.

The American economy, moreso than the political structure, is organized so that the individual "unit", the consumer, is systematically excluded from the decisions affecting the nature of his work, his rewards, his economic opportunities. The modern concentration of corporate wealth is fantastic. The wealthiest one percent of Americans own more than 80 percent of all personal shares of stock. From World War II until the mid-Fifties, the 50 biggest corporations increased their share of manufacturing production from 17 to 23 percent of the national total, and the share of the largest 200 companies rose from 30 to 37 percent. Profits rise inexorably: United States Steel shipped half a million fewer tons of steel in 1957 than 1956, yet earned \$419 million in net profits against the \$348 million of the year before--even after suffering a strike and a grant of \$180 million to the steelworkers in new wages!

To think that the decisions of these economic elites affect merely economic growth is delusion: their "economic" decisions affect all facets of social development. Foreign investments influence political policies in underdeveloped areas. The drive for sales spurs phenomenal advertising efforts: the "ethical drug" industry spent more than \$750 million on promotions in 1960, nearly four times the total amount available to all American medical schools for their educational programs. The arts are organized considerably according to their commercial profitability. The tendency to over-production, to commodity gluts, requires the deliberate creation of pseudo-needs in consumers, and introduces inherently wasteful "planned obsolescence" as a permanent feature of business strategy.\*

\*Statistics on wealth reveal the "have" and "have not" gap at home. Only 5 percent of all those in the "\$5,000 or less" bracket own any stock at all. In 1953, personally-owned wealth in the U.S. stood at \$1 trillion. Of this sum, \$309.2 billion (30.2 percent) was owned by 1,659,000 top wealth-holders (with incomes of \$60,000 or more). This elite comprised 1.04 percent of the population. Their average gross estate estimate was \$182,000, as against the

Within existing arrangements, the American business community cannot be said to encourage a democratic process nationally. Economic minorities not responsible to a public in any democratic fashion, make decisions of more profound social importance than even those made by Congress. The only influence that an individual can exert upon these corporate giants is by means of Congressional regulatory and investigating committees-- whose powers are palliative, not preventative, and notoriously ineffective. American Telephone and Telegraph is an ideal example of both tendencies, that of irresponsible exercise of power and ineffective means of control. To protect its investments in existing facilities, A.T.&T. prevented the public use of one-piece telephones, modern switching equipment, and dial phones long after such modern instruments were developed: nothing could be done to hasten the public use of the new equipment until such use was profitable to the corporation. Further the Federal Communications Commission negotiated a 6.5 percent increase in returns on phone rates with A.T.&T. in 1953 that has been consistently surpassed every year, resulting in an "overcharge" of \$985 million to the American public.

In this situation, work is undertaken to fulfill desperate needs, for status or material goods, or both. Work is accepted for ulterior reasons, rarely for intrinsic qualities, its creative possibilities. In work the individual is regulated as part of the system. In leisure he is regulated as a consumer, the lifelong target of hard-sell, soft-sell, lies and partial truths, appeals to his basest drives, always being told what he is supposed to like while being told, too, that he is a "free" man because of "free" enterprise. Thinking they follow the dictates of their own taste, men revel as consumers of things, centering their lives around a worship of things created rather than a reverence for the process of creation itself.

For all its debasing features, this condition is quite tolerable in comparison to the human misery which prevails, nearly unseen, just beyond the neon lights of modern affluence. At least 35 million people live beneath the levels of minimum subsistence in America, beyond the rehabilitative influence of the Welfare State which is only structured to meet the needs of the lower-middle classes, not of the truly desperate. Whether newcomers or social remnants who were not upgraded by the New Deal reforms, these are the "leftovers" of society, lacking significant union or political expression, becoming more obsolete with each technological advance. When "bad breaks" come for the American poor, they come in plural and debilitating ways: substandard housing, poor health, unpleasant neighborhoods, broken families, bad schools, unemployment, the grinding plague of automation, inadequate retraining programs, social uprooting: all combine to kill personal aspirations.

In the midst of these conditions, the labor movement, historic spokesman for the exploited, is locked in growing inner

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\*(continued from preceding page) national average of \$10,000. They held 80 percent of all corporation stock, virtually all state and local bonds, and between 10 and 33 percent of other types of property: bonds, real estate, mortgages, life insurance, unincorporated businesses, and cash. They receive 40 percent of property, income-rent, interest, dividends. The size of this elite has been relatively constant: 31.6%(1922)30.6%(1939)20.8%(1949)30.2%

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crisis and outer lack of direction. To the American newspaper audience, "Big Labor" is a growing cancer that is at least equally evil as Big Business. Nothing could be more distorted (and more of a tribute to the opinion-manipulating skills of businessmen). To be sure, some unions are bigger than they were in the past. But the biggest of them are far smaller than the corporations they are supposed to counter-vail in the "free economy": compare the auto workers to General Motors, the steelworkers to U.S. Steel, the communications workers to A.T.&T., the oilworkers to Standard Oil. These enormous disparities still fail to give the accurate picture of the modern crisis of labor, however. First, the expectations of the newborn AFL-CIO of thirty million members by 1965 are suffering a reverse unimagined five years ago. The collapse of the dream of "organizing the unorganized" is dramatically reflected in the AFL-CIO decision, just two years after its creation, to slash its organizing staff in half. From 15 million members when the AFL and CIO merged, the total has slipped to 13.5 million. During the post war generation, union membership nationally has increased by four million--but the total labor force has jumped by 13 million. Today only 30 percent of all nonagricultural workers are protected by organization. Second, organizing conditions are going to worsen. Where labor is strongest--in industries, for example--automation is leading to an attrition of available jobs. As the number of jobs dwindles, so too does labor's power of bargaining, since management can more easily handle a strike in an automated plant than in the old, humanly-controlled ones. In addition, the American economy has changed radically in the last decade: suddenly the number of workers producing goods became fewer than the number in the "unproductive" areas--government, trade, finance, services, utilities, transportation. Since World War II "white collar" and "service" jobs have grown twice as fast as have "blue collar" production jobs. Labor has almost no organization in the expanding occupational areas of the new economy, almost all its entrenched strength in contracting areas. As big government hires more and more, as big business seeks more office workers and skilled technicians, and as growing commercial America demands new hotels, service stations and the like, the conditions will become graver still. Further, there is little indication that the South is ripe for labor organization. Finally, there is considerable indication that big business, for the sake of public relations, has acknowledged labor's right to exist, but has deliberately and successfully tried to contain labor to its present strength, preventing strong unions from helping weaker ones, or from spreading to unorganized sectors of the economy. Business is aided in its efforts by a proliferation of "right-to-work" laws at the state level, anti-labor legislation (the Landrum-Griffin bill) in Congress.

But along with all these developments, labor itself--as an historical agency of change--is faced with a crisis of vision. It is the most liberal "mainstream" institution in modern America--but its liberalism is not much extended beyond its immediate self-interest, e.g. housing, favorable labor legislation, medical protection. More important, however, is the fact that much labor liberalism is vestigial, rote rather than radical. Labor's social idealism has waned before the tendencies of bureaucracy, materialism, and business ethics. The moderate success of the last twenty years' struggle has braked, instead

accelerating, labor's zeal for reform. Even the House of Labor has bay windows. Not only is this true of the labor elite, but as well of the rank-and-file. The latter are indifferent unionists, willing to strike if the labor boss will take care of them while they are "out", unwilling to attend meetings, confused by the bureaucratic complexity of labor-management negotiations, lulled to comfort by the accessibility of luxury and the opportunity for long-term contracts. The general absence of union democracy finalizes worker apathy.

Certain problems facing the economy and labor should be seen in a more detailed way. In their newness and urgency, two problems stand out: the revolution in automation, and the replacement of scarcity by the potential of material abundance.

Automation, the process of machines replacing men in performing sensory, motoric, and complicated logical tasks, is transforming society in ways that cannot be fully comprehended. By 1959, industrial production regained its 1957 pre-recession level--but with 750,000 fewer workers required. In the Fifties as a whole, national production enlarged by 43 percent, but the number of factory employees remained stationary--only seven-tenths of 1 percent higher than in 1947. The electronics industry lost 200,000 of 900,000 workers in the years 1953-57. In the steel industry, productive capacity has increased 20 percent since 1955, while the number of workers has fallen 17,000. Employment in the auto industry ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ decreased in the same period from 746,000 to 614,000. The chemical industry has enlarged its productive powers 27 percent although its work force has dropped by three percent. A farmer in 1962 can grow enough to feed 24 people, where one generation ago only 12 could be nourished. The United States Bureau of the Census used 50 statisticians in 1960 to perform the service that required 4,100 in 1950. Automation is destroying whole categories of work--impersonal thinkers have efficiently labelled this "structural unemployment"--in blue-collar, service, and even middle management occupations. In addition, it is eliminating employment opportunities for a youth force that numbers one million more than it did in 1950, and rendering work far more difficult both to find and do for people in their forties and up. The consequence of this economic drama, strengthened by the force of three post-war recessions, are momentous: five million becomes an acceptable unemployment tabulation, and misery, uprootedness and anxiety become the lot of increasing numbers of Americans.

But while automation is creating social dislocation of a stunning kind, it paradoxically is imparting the opportunity for men the world around to rise in dignity from their knees. In the future, there will be fewer and fewer tasks beyond the scope of the machine--and fewer and fewer material impossibilities facing man, if they so choose. For the dominant optimistic economic fact of the epoch is that fewer hands are needed now in actual production although more goods and services are a real potentiality. Sadly, America has reacted to the coming of abundance in the same way it has to the effects of automation on unemployment: with tradition-oriented responses that indicate a lack of political imagination. Our reluctance to fully enter economic Utopia reflects a fear of leaving the "short, nasty, ~~xxxxxxxx~~

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## The Military-Industrial Complex

Not only is ours the first generation to live with the possibility of world-wide cataclysm---it is the first to experience the actual social preparation for cataclysm, the general militarisation of American society. In 1948, just when many of us were becoming anxious about our manliness, Congress required a social test of it by establishing Universal Military Training, the first peacetime conscription. The military bureaucracy was beginning. Four years earlier, General Electric's Charles E. Wilson had heralded the creation of what he called the "permanent war economy", the continuous military spending as a solution to the economic problems unsolved before the post-war Boom, most notably the problem of the seventeen million jobless after eight years of the New Deal.

Since our childhood, these two trends--rise of the military apparatus and installation of the defense economy---have grown fantastically. The Department of Defense, ironically the world's largest single organization, is worth \$160 billion, owns 32 million acres of American land, employs half the 7.5 million persons directly dependent on the Military for subsistence, has an \$11 billion payroll which is larger than the net annual income of all American corporations. Defense spending in the Eisenhower era totalled \$350 billions and President Kennedy entered office pledged to go even beyond the present defense allocation of sixty cents from every public dollar spent. Except for a war-induced boom immediately after we bombed Hiroshima, American economic prosperity has coincided with a growing dependence on military outlay---from 1941 to 1959 America's Gross National Product of \$525 trillion included \$700 million in goods and services purchased for the defense effort, a fraction of about one-seventh of the accumulated GNP. This pattern has included the steady concentration of military spending among a few corporations. In 1961, 86 percent of Defense Department contracts were awarded without competition. The ordnance industry of 100,000 people is completely engaged in military work; in the aircraft industry, 94 percent of 750,000 are linked to the war economy; shipbuilding, radio and communications equipment industries commit forty percent of their work to defense; iron and steel, petroleum, metal-stamping and machine shop products, motors and generators, tools and hardware, copper, aluminum, and machine tools industries all devote at least 10 percent of their work to the same cause.

The intermingling of Big Military and Big Industry is evidenced in the 1,400 former officers working for the 100 corporations who received nearly all the \$21 billion spent in procurement by the Defense Department in 1961. The overlap is most poignantly clear in the case of General Dynamics, the company which received the best 1961 contracts, employed the most retired officers (187), and is directed by a former Secretary of the Army. A Fortune magazine profile of General Dynamics said: "The unique group of men who run Dynamics are only incidentally in rivalry with other U.S. manufacturers, with many of whom they actually act in concert. Their chief competitor is the USSR. The core of General Dynamics corporate philosophy is the conviction that national defense is a more or less permanent business." Little has changed since Wilson's proud declaration of the Permanent War Economy back in the 1944 days when the top 200 corporations possessed 80 percent of all active prime-war-supply contracts. Little, except the menace.

The military and its supporting business foundation have numerous forms of distinctly political expression, and we have heard their din endlessly. There has not been a major Congressional split on the issue of continued defense spending spirals in our lifetime. The triangular relation of the business, military and political arenas cannot be better expressed than in Dixiecrat

Carl Vinson's remarks as his House Armed Services Committee reported out a military construction bill of \$808 million, distributed through 50 states, for 1960-61: "There is something in this bill for everyone", he announced. President Kennedy had earlier acknowledged the valuable anti-recession features of the bill.

Imagine, on the other hand, \$808 million suggested as an anti-recession measure, but being poured into programs of social welfare: The impossibility of receiving support for such a measure identifies a crucial feature of defense spending: it is beneficial to private enterprise, while welfare spending is not. Defense spending does not "compete" with the private sector; it contains a natural obsolescence; its "confidential" nature permits easier boondoggling; the tax burdens to which it leads can be shunted from corporation to consumer as a "cost of production". Welfare spending, however, involves the government in competition with private corporations and contractors; it conflicts with the immediate interests of private pressure groups; it leads to taxes on business. Think of the opposition of private power companies to current proposals for river and valley development, or the hostility of the real estate lobby to urban renewal; or the attitude of the American Medical Association to a paltry medical care bill; or of all business lobbyists to foreign aid; these are the pressures leading to the schizophrenic public-military, private-civilian economy of our epoch. The politicians, of course, take the line of least resistance and thickest support: warfare, instead of welfare, is easiest to stand up for: after all, the Free World is at stake (and our constituency's investments, too).

Business and politics, when significantly militarized, affect the whole living condition of each American citizen. Worker and family depend on the Cold War for life. Half of all research and development is concentrated on military ends. The press mimics conventional cold war opinion in its editorials. In less than a full generation, most Americans accept the military-industrial structure as "the way things are". War is still pictured as one more kind of diplomacy, perhaps a gloriously satisfying kind. Our saturation and atomic bombings of Germany and Japan are little more than memories of past "policy necessities" that preceded the wonderful economic Boom in 1946. The facts that our once-revolutionary 20,000 ton Hiroshima Bomb is now paled by 50 megaton weapons, that our lifetime has included the ballistic missiles, that "greater" weapons are to follow, that weapons refinement is more rapid than the development of weapons of defense, that soon a dozen or more nations will have the Bomb, that one simple miscalculation could incinerate mankind: these orienting facts are but remotely felt. A shell of moral callous separates the citizen from sensitivity of the common peril: this is the result of a lifetime saturation with horror. After all, some ask, where could we begin, even if we wanted to? After all, others declare, we can only assume things are in the best of hands. A coed at the University of Kentucky says, "we regard peace and war as fairy tales". And a child has asked in helplessness, perhaps for us all, "Daddy, why is there a cold war?"

Past senselessness permits present brutality; present brutality is prelude to future deeds of still greater inhumanity; that is the moral history of the twentieth century, from the First World War to the present. A half-century of accelerating destruction has flattened out the individual's ability to make moral distinctions, it has made people understandably give up, it has forced private worry and public silence.

To a decisive extent, the means of defense, the military technology itself, determines the political and social character of the state being defended--

that is, defense mechanisms themselves in the nuclear age alter the character of the system that creates them for protection. So it has been with America, as her democratic institutions and habits have shrivelled in almost direct proportion to the growth of her armaments. Decisions about military strategy, including the monstrous decision to go to war, are more and more the property of the Military and the industrial arms race machine, with the politicians assuming a ratifying role, instead of a determining one. This is increasingly a fact not just because of the installation of the permanent military, but because of constant revolutions in military technology. The new technologies allegedly require military expertise, scientific comprehension, and the mantle of secrecy. As Congress relies more and more on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, Pentagon, their hired science machine and lobbying troupes the existing chasm between people and decision-makers becomes irreconcilably wide, and more alienating in its effects.

A necessary part of the military effort is propaganda: to "sell" congressional appropriating committees, to conceal various business scandals, and to convince the American people that the arms race is important enough to sacrifice civil liberties and social welfare. So confusion prevails about the national needs, while the three major services and their industrial allies jockey for power--the Air Force tending to support bombers and missiles, the Navy Polaris and carriers, the Army conventional ground forces and invulnerable nuclear arsenals, and all three feigning unity by support of the policy of weapons agglomeration called "the mix". Strategies are advocated on the basis of power and profit, usually more than on the basis of military needs. In the meantime, Congressional investigating committees--most notably the House Un-American Activities Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee--attempt to curb the little dissent that finds its way into off-beat magazines. A huge militant anti-communist brigade throws in its support, patriotically willing to do anything to achieve "total victory" in the Cold War, the Government advocates peaceful confrontation with international communism, then utterly pillories and outlaws the tiny American Communist Party. University professors withdraw prudently from public issues; the very style of social science writing becomes more qualified, studies show. Needs in housing, education, minority rights, health care, land redevelopment, hourly wages, are all subordinated--though a political tear is shed gratuitously--to the primary objective of the "military and economic strength of the Free World".

What are the governing policies which supposedly justify all this human sacrifice and waste? With few exceptions they have reflected the quandaries and confusion, stagnation and anxiety, of a stalemated nation in a turbulent world. They have shown a slowness, sometimes a sheer inability to react to a sequence of new problems.

Of these problems, two of the newest are foremost: the existence of poised nuclear weapons and the revolutions against the former colonial powers. In the both areas, the Soviet Union and various national communist movements have aggravated international relations in inhuman and undesirable ways, but hardly so much as to blame only communism for the present menacing situation.

...liberalism... beyond...  
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### Nuclear Policy

The accumulation of nuclear arsenals, the threat of accidental war, the possibility of limited war becoming illimitable holocaust, the impossibility of achieving real arms superiority or final invulnerability, the near nativity of a cluster of infant atomic powers--all of these events have tended to underminetradition concepts of international relations. War can no longer be considered as an instrument of international politics, a way of strengthening alliances, adjusting the balance of power, maintaining national sovereignty, or defending any values. War guarantees none of these things today. Soviet or American "megatonnage" is sufficient to destroy all existing social structure as well as human values; missiles have thumbed (figuratively) their nosecones at national boundaries. America, however, still operates by means of national defense and deterrence systems. These are effective only so long as they are never fully used: unless we can convince Russia that we will commit the most vicious action in human history, we will have to do it.

"They are not meant to be used. They keep the peace because nobody is made enough to wish the end of the world. In our jargon, if you will, no one dares to strike first because no one is prepared to accept retaliation". Can international stability be pivoted around Doomsday weapons? How long? What will happen when China, Germany, Poland, France, Japan, Egypt, Israel and ten other countries get the Bomb? What about mechanical failures then? What about being able to distinguish accident from aggression then?

"We in the Air Force especially favor being prepared to win the war, though we do want to prevent its coming, if at all possible. The trick, as we see it, is to get invulnerable weapons of our own, then be prepared to strike at Russia's military bases only". Do you really think you can just hit atomic installations with your counterforce designs? What about the nearby cities? Do you think those Russians will respond in the rational way you expect, by attacking only our military centers? If they are so rational, why do you say they won't negotiate with us? Do you really think the arms race can go on permanently?

"We favor an invulnerable deterrent, too, so that all wars of the future will be fought conventionally. We expect a series of struggles, a protracted conflict with the Reds. A long twilight struggle--that's what the President calls it all". If a country is losing a small war--and what does it mean to discuss small or conventional wars today?--will it decide against using atomic weapons and risking escalation to thermonuclear conflict? What will you do about accidents, or about the little countries with the big weapons? Why hasn't any nation ever achieved satisfactory vulnerability, and why do you expect that we will be the first?

"I'd rather be dead than red personally, and I think that most likely we'll avoid both if we sit tight until Russia opens up in a few years. But let's be realistic. If war comes, it comes. It will be bad, maybe 100 million dead, but the nation will recover as it did after the last war". Is such patriotism truly realistic? Doesn't sitting tight abdicate all chance of intervening in the arms race? In what sense does a nation "recover" when 100 million of its people are dead? You only mentioned the dead people when you referred to recovery: what of the rest of the system, the communications, the

disease among the living and unborn, the psychological chaos, the ruined part of social relations, the transportation system? If it will be possible to recover in that infernal moment, why is it not possible to recover now from the less awful predicaments gripping us?

Not since the years immediately after World War II, when the Soviet Union was without atomic weapons and the United Nations was overwhelmingly pro-Western, have we committed ourselves ~~convincingly~~ and unequivocally to the goal of a disarmed world. We have blamed our reluctance on the inadequacies of international rule-making institutions--institutions which could have been improved. We have blamed faulty inspection mechanisms--when the mechanisms were not faulty in the minds of others, or when they were easily refinable. Especially, we have blamed the Russians--while it has become steadily clearer that the Russians, their tyrannies and cynicisms granted, and their foreign policy zig-zagging as well, find disarmament to be more in their economic and political interests than the armaments race.

We do not contend that the Cold War predicaments are solely the fault of the West. We do not contend that disarmament would come tomorrow if only America would will it--the Russians do not trust us, and there are significant groupings in the Soviet Union who favor a "hot" arms race to the reconciling qualities of disarmament. We do contend, as Americans, that our government has blamed everything but its own hesitation, its own anachronistic dependence on weapons, its own fears of the uncertain world beyond the Cold War. What our government has not blamed is its own theory that the risks of the present are fewer than the risks of serious change. Again, at a time demanding vision and flexibility, America hesitates in policy paralysis. But now even hesitation itself has changed--where once it boded safety of transition, today it perpetuates the drift towards conflict. We are edging toward a war which will not be fought between American and Russia, not externally between two national entities, but the first international civil war, within the unrespected and unestablished human civitas which spans the world.

## The Colonial Revolution

While weapons have accelerated man's opportunity for self-destruction, the counter-impulse to life and creation are superbly manifest in the revolutionary feelings of many Asian, African and Latin American peoples. Against the individual initiative and aspiration, and social sense of organicism characteristic of these upsurges, the American apathy and stalemate stand in embarrassing contrast.

It is difficult today to give human meaning to the welter of facts that surrounds us. That is why it is especially hard to understand the facts of "underdevelopment": In India, man and beast together produced 65 percent of the nation's economic energy, and of the remaining 35 percent of inanimately produced power almost three-fourths was obtained by burning dung. But in the United States, human and animal power together account for only one percent of the national economic energy--that is what stands humanly behind the vague term "industrialization". Even to maintain the misery of Asia today at a constant level will require a rate of growth tripling the national income and the aggregate production by the end of the century. For Asians to have the (unacceptable) 1950 standard of Europeans, less than \$2,000 per year for a family, national production must increase 21-fold by the end of the century, and that monstrous feat only to reach a level that Europeans find intolerable.

What has America done? During the years 1955-57 our total expenditures in economic aid were equal to one-tenth of one percent of our total Gross National Product. Prior to that time it was less; since then it has been a fraction higher. Immediate social and economic development is needed--we have helped little, seeming to prefer to create a growing gap between "have" and "have not" rather than to usher in social revolutions which would threaten our investors and our military alliances. The new nations want to avoid power entanglements that will open their countries to foreign domination--and we have often demanded loyalty oaths. They do not see the relevance of uncontrolled free enterprise in societies without accumulated capital and a significant middle class--and we have looked scornfully on those who would not try "our way". They seek empathy--and we have sided with the old colonialists, who now are trying to take credit for "giving" all the freedom that has been wrested from them, or we "empathize" when pressure absolutely demands it.

With rare variation, American foreign policy in the Fifties was guided by a concern for foreign investment, a negative anti-communist political stance linked to a series of military alliances, both undergirded by military threat. We participated unilaterally--usually through the Central Intelligence Agency--in revolutions against governments in Laos, Guatemala, Cuba, Egypt, Iran. We permitted economic investment to decisively affect our foreign policy: fruit in Cuba, oil in the Middle East, diamonds and gold in South Africa (with whom we trade more than with any African nation). More exactly: America's "foreign market" in the late Fifties, including exports of goods and services plus overseas sales by American firms, averaged about \$60 billion annually. This represented twice the investment of 1950, and it is predicted that the same rates of increase will continue. The reason is obvious; Fortune said in 1958, "foreign earnings will more than double in ten years, more than twice the probable gain in domestic profits". These investments are concentrated primarily in the Middle East and Latin America, neither region being an impressive candidate for the long-run stability, political caution, and lower-class tolerance that American investors typically demand.

Our pugnacious anti-communism and protection of interests has led us to

an alliance not entirely appropriately called "the free world". It includes four major parliamentary democracies: ourselves, Canada, Great Britain, and India. It also has included through the years Batista, Franco, Verwoerd, Salazar, De Gaulle, Boun Oum, Ngo Diem, Chiang-Kai-Shek, Trujillo, the Somozas, Saud, and Ydigoras--all of these non-democrats separating us deeply from the colonial revolutions.

Since the Kennedy administration began, the American government seems to have initiated policy changes in the colonial and underdeveloped areas. It accepted "neutralism" as a tolerable principle; it sided more than once with the Angolans in the United Nations; it invited Souvanna Phouma to return to Laos after having overthrown his neutralist government there; it impemented the Alliance for Progress that Eisenhower had proposed when Latin America appeared on the verge of socialist revolutions; it made derogatory statements about the Trujillos; it cautiously suggested that a democratic socialist government in British Guiana might be necessary to support; in inaugural oratory, it suggested that a moral imperative was involved in sharing the world's resources with those who have been previously dominated. These were hardly sufficient to heal the scars of past activity and present associations, but nevertheless they were motions away from the Fifties. But quite unexpectedly, the President ordered the Cuban invasion, and while the American press railed about how we had been "shamed" and defied by ~~by~~ that "monster Castro", the colonial peoples of the world wondered whether our foreign policy had really changed from its old imperialist ways (we had never supported Castro, even on the eve of his taking power, and had announced early that "the conduct of the Castor government toward foreign private enterprise in Cuba" would be a main state Department concern). Any heralded changes in our foreign policy are now further suspect in the wake of the Punta d'el Este foreign minister's conference where the five countries representing most of Latin America refused to cooperate in our plans to further "isolate" the Castro government.

Ever since the colonial revolution began, American policy makers have reacted to new problems with old "gunboat" remedies, often thinly disguised. The feeble but desirable efforts of the Kennedy administration to be more flexible are coming perhaps too late, and are of too little significance to really change the historical thrust of our policies. The hunger problem is increasing rapidly mostly as a result of the worldwide population explosion that cancels out the meager triumphs gain so far over starvation. The threat of population to economic growth is simply documented: in 1960-70 population in Africa south of the Sahara will increase 14 percent; in South Asia and the Far East by 22 percent; in North Africa 26 percent; in the Middle East by 27 percent; in Latin America 29 percent. Population explosion, no matter how devastating, is neutral. But how long will it take to create a relation of trust between America and the newly-developing societies. How long to change our policies? And in what length of time?

The world is in transformation. But America is not. It can race to industrialize the world, tolerating occasional authoritarianisms, socialisms, neutralisms along the way--or it can slow the pace of the inevitable and default to the eager Soviets and, much more importantly, to mankind itself. Only mystics would guess we have opted for the first. Consider what our people think of this, the most urgent issue on the human agenda. Fed by a bellicose press, manipulated by economic and political opponents of change, drifting in their own history, they grumble about "the foreign aid waste", or about "that beatnik down in Cuba", or how "things will get us by"...thinking confidently, albeit in the usual bewilderment, that Americans can go right on like