JOHNSON
WITH EYES OPEN

by

Robb Burlage
Edited by Douglas Ireland and the PEP staff

CONTENTS

"Let Us Continue to Begin with LBJ"
by Robb Burlage

Excerpts from articles on President Johnson

The Johnson Voting Record

Robb Burlage is a doctoral candidate at Harvard, now working in Nashville, Tenn., where he is active in grass roots politics and the southern student movement.

Published by:

POLITICAL EDUCATION PROJECT
119 Fifth Avenue room 309
New York, N.Y. 10003
(associated with Students for a Democratic Society)
Although "Johnson with Eyes Open" was prepared by EPB before the 1964 elections, we continue to distribute it because it is of greater relevance now during his term of office.
“LET US CONTINUE TO BEGIN WITH L B J”
Robb Burlage,
edited by
Douglas Ireland

LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON----THE PUBLIC RECORD

Johnson the man and Johnson the politician are very complicated subjects. Out of the Texas dust-bowl of the 1930's came Lyndon Johnson, who won his political spurs as Texas director of the National Youth Administration—a post he was given by that great Southern liberal, Aubrey Williams. In 1938, he was elected to Congress on the coat-tails of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who campaigned hard for new young candidates that year. Ten years later in 1948, Johnson, in a chameleon-like move, ran and won as a very conservative Democrat against Coke Stevenson, an out-and-out reactionary. Johnson won only by a narrow 67-vote margin—a margin provided by the tardy arrival of an uncounted box of "votes" from a machine county. As a Congressman, Johnson voted for Taft-Hartley and against the Federal Anti-lynch Law. His record on labor was such that he failed to win the support of the state AFL.

LBJ came to political power nationally in the congress of the Eisenhower "No New Starts" Fifties, and attuned himself to the status-quo limits of a Byrd-Dirksen Congress. It is no wonder that Johnson, ringing of his own End-of-Ideology, once wrote in an article for the Texas Quarterly that he is a liberal on human rights and a conservative on economics, characteristically failing to acknowledge that there might be fearful conflict between these views.

JOHNSON'S COALITION

Johnson has come through the first three hundred days of his administration with less of a concrete grasp than his predecessor of the hard questions that our society must answer. Generating what appears to be the most wonderfully ambiguous political head of steam in American history, LBJ is able to coast into office largely because people are appalled by the Goldwater candidacy. Johnson, like Napoleon III, is a consolidationist, an all-things-to-all-people in ways that Mr. Kennedy never could have been. This gives Johnson both much-needed political leverage and escape hatches. At his best moments—such as his "Great Society" speech at the University of Michigan—he appears to be "an FDR without the 'objective conditions' of an all-out depression." At some of his worse moments—making super-sanguine statements on the good times our economy is enjoying, or side-stepping or accelerating on Vietnam—he is just plain Lyndon.

Mr. Johnson (not unlike the Kennedys, who are still an uneasy and reviving force in his loose alliance) wants to develop an ambiguously broad national coalition. His unity talk pretends that he is in one-party Mexico, where the Party of Revolutionary Institutions insists that the revolution of conflict is over and everyone must unite behind the revolutionary vehicle that is The Party. This view does not admit to the genuine conflicts in American society which must be resolved before the American Revolution is complete.

Johnson will never let anything come to a head—his ability to fill the Eisenhower vacuum pointed the way to one of the peculiar things about this particular capitalist system; it has always found ways to drain off the "venom," to curb polarization, to give reform, and to prevent structural change. Johnson, in this sense, is a perfect reflection of the inside-dopester, marginal-to-business, muddle-through system of government which characterizes our Republic.
The amazing corporate consensus behind LBJ makes it necessary to stop and analyze just where his "management" is leading. There are definite signs that the "American Corporate Planned Economy" in behalf of profits, order, and only residually, public needs, is beginning to appear on the horizon. Note should be taken of Hubert Humphrey's appeal to corporate management for a full government-business partnership—a common Johnson theme—which was accompanied by the declaration that "the country is mature enough for Government to agree that profits should be adequate to provide funds for reinvestment and expansion."

Secretary of the Treasury Dillon recently announced that the last three and a half years have crossed a "significant watershed" in the history of American economic policy. The general acceptance of "macro-economic manipulation" at the federal level—budget deficits, tax cuts, discretionary monetary and fiscal policies—is thus seen as the "turning point" in rationalizing the American economy. Yet, despite the tax cut and the flicker of expenditures expected for the war on poverty, the basic assumptions of the Administration remain that retraining, highways, and government community organizers will bring jobs to the Other America without anything else being needed. The problems of automation, defense conversion, poverty, economic security and economic participation have yet to be touched by national policy.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 must be seen as the "Wagner Act" of organizing around economic issues. And, the challenge remains to organize the Other America to make its political demands. Will the Economic Opportunity Act suffer the fate of the Full Employment Act of 1946—a bill passed by Congress but never implemented because of the lack of organized political support for it? Clearly, this is bound to happen, unless intellectuals, activists, and community organizers reject the purist "Tweedle dum-Tweedledum" theory. Johnson's faults have been outlined—we recognize them. Yet Johnson the politician is above all responsive to political pressure. What occurred at the Democratic National Convention is an example—the Freedom Democrats won a victory because they came to the convention as a well organized political force; they came, not with a "plague on both your houses" attitude, but in critical support of Johnson. Giving the underclass of America a political voice, linking the struggles of the economically deprived to those of the Negro freedom movement in a political way, radicals have a role to play in winning from within Johnson's loose coalition concessions to the left rather than to the highly-organized and politicized right.

Negroes have no place else to turn except to LBJ, but it is known that the Civil Rights Act was a memorial to Mr. Kennedy and is still just a law, not a change of life. The real question is how President Johnson will view the demand for a new life being raised by the people who must vote in the streets of city slums and on the steps of rural courthouses. Will the FBI be sent to Harlem to seek "outside agitators," or will they be sent to Mississippi in search of racist killers? Will the Federal government apply as much assistance to Harlem and the Delta as has been promised to Appalachia? Will the needed political leverage and financial resources of their Administration be utilized to tear down the ghettos and open the entire urban community to all of America's people?

Peace is an issue because of Goldwater's holy crusade against Communism—he views America's world role as God's Policemen. But the "twilight struggle" goes on from

the Gulf of Tonkin to the Straights of Florida. Will Vietnam escalate into a second "Cuban crisis?" How will the administration respond to the rising demands of the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America? How will revolutionary events in these nations be "explained?" Will adventurism and world-wide police-duty be our continuing foreign policy?

In this November of "a choice but no echoes," we must keep our wits about us. We must keep our feet planted firmly in communities of concern and communities of protest. We must back Lyndon Johnson in 1964 not only for what he could be, but because he is at least a responsive politician with a certain amount of freedom to move in a positive direction because of the broad nature of his coalition. We must oppose Goldwater not only because he counterposes the politics of the 1880's to the politics of the 1930's, as Mike Harrington has said, but because he wishes to vent the underbelly of frustration and greed in this nation in a final lunge of world nihilism. The choice is clear.
The following excerpts were taken from journals and articles of a variety of political persuasions. Some were written before the Kennedy assassination, some after it; all were written before the '64 campaign got under way. In a sense these excerpts are "dated" but it is for that reason they offer an interesting perspective on Johnson's activity.

William V. Shannon, in one of the finest discussions of pre-1960 Johnson, writes in the January 1960 Progressive. The reader should keep in mind that Shannon's comments were directed at Johnson's potential Presidential nomination, though of course LBJ's nomination for Vice-President and subsequent elevation to the Presidency make the comments relevant. Shannon's remarks (drastically edited from an excellent history/exposition) follow:

Lyndon Johnson (is) the man who brought "guided democracy" to the U.S. Senate and a bland, unwonted surface of harmony to the Democratic Party. . .. If he were elected, the balance of power within the (Democratic Party) would move decisively, as it has during the last several years in the Senate, from dependence on the big cities and the labor unions to a reliance on the Solid South and the regional economic interest groupings of the plains and mountain states. The interests of Southerners, the Texas and Californian oil men, the Western ranchers and grazers, and the middle classes of the small towns have always been represented in the Democratic Party, but not since FDR's election in 1932 have they been the controlling voice. In 1936, Roosevelt compelled the repeal of the convention rule requiring 2/3 majority for the Presidential nomination in order to make certain these interests could not exercise a veto on party affairs.

As recently as 1930, Democrats were the party of the South and Northwest; New York, Pennsylvania, and California were rock-ribbed Republican strongholds. If the Democrats this year choose a Texan who leads a moderate-conservative coalition, who voted for Taft-Hartley, sabotaged the pro-civil rights reform in the Senate, aggressively defends the predatory oil and gas interests, is indifferent to civil liberties issues, and makes "economy first" speeches to the Chamber of Commerce, they will be delivering their party into the hands of its old possessors.

Texas twenty-five years ago was a predominantly agricultural state. Cotton and beef were king. The active entry of oil and gas men into politics lay in the future. International trade was important. Wall Street was the symbol of higher interest rates, discriminatory freight rates, high electric power rates, and protective tariffs that interfered with the international cotton trade. For the best old-fashioned reasons, Johnson was liberal and internationalist. He appears to have reached a definite turn in the road by 1946. Even now, Johnson is not regarded by oil men as their own or entirely "safe", but in recent years he has made his peace with them.

Johnson believes debate is a waste of time. He tries constantly to reconcile differences off the floor. He has come to regard angry floor controversy as a symbol of personal failure, and public disagreement a matter of reproach. There must be no major defeats, no public retreats, no open failures. He has never suffered a serious defeat on the floor during seven years as leader because he has never risked a setback.
Willie Morris (then editor of "The Texas Observer") discusses Johnson's role in Texas politics in a September 1962 article in Harpers:

Texas can be described as a three-party state--liberal Democrats, conservative Democrats, and Republicans; or as a no-party state; or as a state with incoherent factional warfare more befitting France or Italy. The central figure in this politics of transition is Vice President Lyndon Johnson. His shrewd understanding of the shifting power structures in his home state has given him a base for a national prominence unmatched since the Civil War by any Southern politician (if Woodrow Wilson may be relegated to New Jersey). Johnson, whose mastery of personal politics and backroom diplomacy made him one of the U.S. Senate's greatest parliamentary geniuses, has--at home--successfully played one group against another as the times demanded. But he is not "king"of Texas, as the national myth might have it. With the late Speaker Rayburn, he has been a kind of balance of power, a unique force standing between and slightly apart from the conservative financial establishment on the one hand and the gathering forces of postwar reform liberalism on the other. A thoroughgoing political pragmatist who is now a partner in President Kennedy's New Frontier liberalism, his ideological position on the state scene has been almost impossible to define.

Unlike Sam Rayburn, Johnson has not inspired love and affection at home. His friends and allies honor and fear him. Many conservatives and many liberals in Texas bitterly dislike and distrust him, not merely because he is Lyndon Johnson, but because they have grown to fear his power. Addressing a recent University of Texas seminar on "The Issues which Divide Us", the Vice President said he wondered if he had been asked to speak "as an expert or an example." For him, this was a most uncharacteristic statement. His principal themes in Texas, against the threat of growing and more well-defined and even more partisan political warfare, have been unity and harmony.

A political party, such as Texas', which runs the gamut from income tax abolition to unamalgurged New Frontier liberalism is less a party than a continuing riot. These internecine battles are more than mere factionalism. They are a fight to the finish for outright control. Johnson, as Senator, and Speaker Rayburn were usually the arbiters, playing conservatives against liberals in the party infighting.

Michael Munk, writing in November 28th, 1963:

During World War II, Texas began to change. The oil industry grew to dominate the state's economy, natural gas was developed as a consumer fuel and a giant petrochemical complex was built near Houston and the Gulf Coast. In 1946 came Johnson's last major act of political defiance of the "interests"--as they came to be known--he had attacked during most of six successive terms in the House. He voted against the easing of price controls on oil and also joined a minority of 80 other House members in voting against a $75,000 appropriation for HUAC. But in the following year, he red-baited hard against reconfirmation of the progressive Leland Olds as chairman of the Federal Power Commission--and voted for Taft-Hartley.

So as the 1948 elections approached, his bid for a Senate seat was backed by several oil men, including Sid Murchison. After his election, one of the first people to greet him when he moved from one side of the Capitol to the other was Bobby Baker, then chief page of the Senate, with whom a long and ultimately embarrassing political association was formed.
Although Johnson has never been considered a completely "safe" man by Texas oil and gas interests, he also was no longer the trust-busting young liberal of New Deal days. He supported the oil interests on depletion allowances and the Tidelands issue and determinedly changed his image from liberal to moderate conservative. By 1951, he was made Democratic whip and immediately elevated Baker to the post of assistant secretary to the party contingent. And in 1953, before a severe heart attack, he arrived in the post of Senate Majority leader and the center of a new Senate Establishment which he led for the next seven years of the Eisenhower Administration. Indeed, the Establishment—headed after Johnson by Oklahoma millionaire Sen. Robert Kerr, and led today by Sen. George Russell of Georgia—has been referred to as "the personal creation of LBJ" (Life, Nov. 22). And he took Baker with him.

It was in this post that Johnson acquired his reputation as the "complete politician." His behind-the-scenes activity held party lines on important issues and balanced personal and regional interests against one another. As a tactician, he never risked a serious political defeat. Referring to the cloakroom maneuvers of the Senate, Johnson said, "There is nothing sinister or shady or backroom about what I do. Somebody has to be in the middle and bring people together."

In dealing in the Senate with the late Joseph McCarthy, Johnson aimed that only after McCarthy came into blunt opposition to the Republican leadership could his defeat be assured. He waited silently until McCarthy did just that, and then worked in favor of a censure motion that brought not a single dissent from the Democrats. In 1957, he guided the first civil rights bill since the Civil War through the Senate by maneuvering carefully between the Dixiecrats and the liberals. His relations with labor were strained when he allowed the more anti-labor House version of the Landrum-Griffin act to pass Senate conferees without a fight, and they were brought to the breaking point in 1959, when a letter in which he expressed his agreement with Goldwater's labor-baiting views was made public.

As Vice President, Johnson has stayed out of the spotlight as the chairman of two White House committees: the National Space Council in which he pushed for private ownership of the communications satellites, and the Equal Opportunity Committee. His 1960 campaign manager, John Connally, was made Secretary of the Navy. After Connally resigned to run successfully for the governorship of Texas, he was succeeded by a fellow Texan, Fred Korth—who in turn resigned under fire. Other Johnson men brought into the Administration include James Webb, head of the NASA; Jerry Holleman, who resigned as Assistant Labor Secretary in the wake of the Billy Sol Estes scandal; and George McGee of the State Department's policy planning staff.

Johnson's interest in the space and defense program has resulted in an unprecedented boom in his home state. Houston landed the Space Flight Center that will bring billions of dollars to the area, and the controversial TFX contract, which may be worth over $10 billion, was presented to General Dynamic's Ft. Worth plant.

The President's name was mentioned in connection with TFX Nov. 19, when Sen. Carl Curtis (R-Neb) introduced into the record of the Senate Permanent Investigating subcommittee a letter written just before the 1960 election by Deputy Defense Secretary Foswell Gilpatric to General Dynamic's president (and former Army Secretary) Frank Pace Jr. Gilpatric, then a corporation lawyer in the firm which represented General Dynamics, noted in the letter that "political considerations" might play a part in the choice between producing the aircraft at the company's Convair plants at San Diego or Ft. Worth. Gilpatric illustrated this reference with a notation "Nixon for California v. Johnson for Texas."
James Tracy Crown, in "The Nation" for December 14, 1963, discusses LBJ as a "national Democrat" and a national politician, and suggests possibilities and pitfalls in his growth:

What Kind of Political Man is Johnson? For immediate and overwhelmingly important political purposes, the most salient political fact about Johnson is that he is not yet fully a national figure. Despite the enormous contributions of the press and television, which make it seem as if overnight Johnson has become established as a truly national figure, every precinct leader outside the South knows this simply is not so. During the 1960 campaign, Johnson was largely ghettoized in the South. He has superb sensitivity to the complex emotions and interests which motivate the Southern voter and invaluable ability to bring out the very best and restrain the worst in them. But he has often proved himself appallingly ignorant of the complex creature the urban, non-Southern voter is, and the art of creating enthusiasm in these men and women has thus far largely escaped him.

The AFL-CIO voting record, a donkey that never forgets, shows Senator Johnson voting wrong on injunction legislation, unemployment compensation, natural gas regulation, off-shore oil, oil depletion, tax allowances, and Senate rules, particularly filibusters. On the other hand, he often supported social security legislation, foreign aid, and a very -- underscore very -- limited civil rights bill, all of which were not particularly popular with his financial backers at home.

A comparison of his with other Southern voting records (Johnson, despite pretensions, was never truly a Westerner) shows that even on non-civil rights issues, Johnson was clearly less of a national Democrat than Senators Lister Hill and John Sparkman of Alabama -- a pretty tough state from which to be a national Democrat -- and certainly less of a national Democrat than Senators Estes Kefauver or Albert Gore of Tennessee, or Yarborough of Texas. Johnson on this score ranks about with Senator Olin Johnson of South Carolina, hardly as progressive as Johnson's urbanizing Texas.

On foreign affairs, Johnson at times seems to have been assigned as Kennedy's thunderer, thus taking on, perhaps unwillingly, tones of Dulles.

What Pitfalls are to be Avoided in Working with Johnson? Most important, Johnson's potential for growth, while not to be romanticized, must not be underestimated. He understands a great deal about power. Like Truman, he can face harsh realities and make hard, quick decisions -- not always liberal Democratic qualities. He is decent, intelligent, hard-driving, thoroughly political and deeply patriotic. He will never spare his talents where his country's needs are concerned. He has a warm and generous side to his personality that helps him win cooperation from tough opponents. Particularly in his last years in the Senate his Vice-Presidency, he showed considerable growth as an individual and politician.

What Can Be Done Now? Issue-oriented national Democrats must watch to see whether Johnson carries on the work of over-riding the contract-hungry military-industrial complex in order to pursue a nuclear detente with the Soviet Union. They must watch because his political life has been closely involved with the political distribution and entrenchment of enormous defense and space expenditures; outsized portions have gone to Texas and the Congressional Establishment of which Johnson was a charter member.
Jane Agrinier, in the January 1964 issue of the liberal democrat:

It was almost inevitable that Johnson make some kind of peace with the oil interests when they began to play an increasingly dominant role in Texas politics, and he appears to have done so, although it should be noted that he is not considered to be dependent on them. It is true that he might have chosen to try to fight the oil barons -- he was in a better position than many other officeholders to do so -- but he is not the kind of man to go into a fight he knows he will almost surely lose. And, today, even a liberal like Senator Ralph Yarbrough does not crusade on the oil issue.

Yet the regulation of these oil interests is a must. The influence they exercise in not only the name of Texas but in a number of other states -- California, Louisiana and Oklahoma, to name only the largest -- on the political structures of this country is already too strong. They must be brought under control. What Lyndon Johnson as President will, and can, do about this problem that Lyndon Johnson as Senator could not, or would not, remains to be seen.

It is true that throughout his public career he has not displayed the usual Southern racial prejudices. As Vice-President he headed the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, and make it a much more active committee than it had been under Vice-President Nixon.

His views on international affairs were, until a few years ago, practically unknown. There was, it is true, his traditional liberalism on international trade issues, and he had supported the Marshall Plan, Point 4, and so on. But his lack of identification with any well-defined program in foreign policy was one of his greatest weaknesses as a Presidential candidate. He seems not to have been much interested in what was going on outside the country except as it affected this country. He was not an isolationist, but he was provincial.

The Vice-Presidency gave Johnson experience in just that area in which he needed it most -- foreign affairs. The man who had left the U.S. twice during his 12 years as a Senator travelled nearly 100,000 miles during his first two years as Vice-President.

The Presidency does different things to different men. Lyndon Johnson, the astute politician from Texas, has been talking more like a statesman ever since he became Vice-President. Certainly we have every right to hope that, as President, he will retain the best qualities of the politician and continue to develop those of the statesman. The office of President is demanding, difficult, and a many-faced job; its holder needs all the support and good will possible.
Presented below are excerpts from the Johnson voting record as compiled by the Congressional Quarterly, Special Report of September 11, 1964.

In general, we have eliminated votes on amendments to main motions, unless such amendments reveal a position not reflected by the final vote.

We have not reported votes in many areas of foreign policy, but have tried to devote our limited space to domestic issues of interest to our constituency.

1943—Increase national debt limit to $210 billion. Passed 268-129 (D81-113; R187-12)* March 12, Johnson AGAINST.

1945—Amendment to give persons aggrieved by O.P.A. orders the right to appeal to federal district courts. Adopted 200-164 (D17-154; R153-8)* June 23, Johnson AGAINST.

1946—Price Control Termination. Adopted 209-189 (D15-171; R164-16)* April 17, Johnson AGAINST.

1948—Income tax reduction bill: passage over veto. Veto overridden 311-88 (D82-84; R229-2)* April 2, Johnson AGAINST.

1954—Increase annual personal income tax exemption from $600 to $700 and delete provisions granting dividend exclusions and tax credit. Rejected 49-42 (D13-4; R2-45)* June 30, Johnson FOR.

1959—Repeal 4 percent tax credit on dividend income. Agreed to 47-31 (D44-7; R3-24) June 25, Johnson FOR.

1959—Reduce on a graduated scale the depletion allowance on oil and gas wells. Rejected 21-54 (D16-33; R5-21) June 25, Johnson AGAINST.

1960—Repeal the 4 percent tax credit on dividend income exceeding $50 from domestic corporations. Agreed to 42-41 (D39-12; R3-29) June 20, Johnson FOR.

1960—Establish a 20 percent withholding tax on income from interest and dividends. Rejected 24-62 (D22-31; R2-31) June 20, Johnson AGAINST.

1964—Amendment to Revenue Act of 1964 deleting a House provision that would reduce capital gains tax rates. Accepted 56-25 (D45-6; R11-19) Feb. 3, President Johnson in Favor.

1964—Increase the minimum standard deduction for each taxpayer and his dependent by $100 and reduce the corporate income tax rate to 50 percent rather than 48 percent. Rejected 23-71 (D21-41; R2-30) Feb. 5, President Johnson OPPOSED.

*In vote breakdowns, party figures do not always add up to vote totals because of independent or minor party Senators and Representatives.
1964—Revenue Act of 1964, cutting personal and corporate taxes by $11.9 billion over a two-year period. Passed 77-21 (D 56-11; R 21-10) Feb. 7. President Johnson IN FAVOR.

Key votes on domestic aid and business:

1958—Cut Community Facilities Act authorization from $1 billion to $500 million. Rejected 33-52 (D 2-42; R 31-10) April 16. Johnson AGAINST.

1959—Depressed Areas bill, authorizing $389.5 million federal loans and grants to aid areas of chronic unemployment. Passed 49-46 (D 45-16; R 4-30) March 23. Johnson FOR.

1959—Create a 150,000-member Youth Conservation Corps to combat delinquency, aid conservation. Passed 47-45 (D 45-15; R 2-30) Aug. 13. Johnson FOR.

1960—Authorize $251 million federal aid to depressed areas. Failed to pass over veto (two-thirds vote required) 45-39 (D 40-14; R 5-25) May 24. Johnson FOR.

1964—Passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 authorizing $947.2 million in fiscal 1965 for a variety of federal anti-poverty programs and an Office of Economic Opportunity in the Executive Office of the President to direct and coordinate the projects. Passed 61-34 (D 51-12; R 10-22) July 23. President Johnson IN FAVOR.

Key votes on housing and urban renewal:


1949—National Housing Act of 1949 (S 1070), providing five-year program for slum clearance and low-cost housing construction. Passage of the bill. Passed 57-13 (D 33-2; R 24-11) April 21. Johnson FOR.

1954—Put a maximum of 35,000 annual new starts in low-rent public housing. Agreed to 46-16 (D 28-13; R 18-2) June 3. Johnson FOR.

1957—Authorize construction of additional 200,000 low-cost public housing units per year. Rejected 20-54 (D 17-22; R 3-32) May 29. Johnson AGAINST.

1959—Boost urban renewal funds to $450 million a year for four years. Rejected 33-56 (D 32-26; R 1-30) Feb. 5. Johnson AGAINST.

1959—Passage of second housing bill over veto (two-thirds majority needed). Failed to pass 58-36 (D 52-9; R 6-27) Sept. 4. Johnson FOR.

1960—Authorize 37,000 additional public housing units. Rejected 38-42 (D 31-19; R 7-23) June 16. Johnson FOR.

**Failure to add to totals occurred when Morse (Ore.) was listed as an Independent.**
LABOR VOTES


1943-- Bill to make unions subject to Anti-Racketeering Act. Passed 270-107 (D 115-70; R 154-34) April 9. Johnson FOR.

1943-- Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Bill. Amendments to outlaw political contributions by unions. Adopted 236-135 (D 97-91; R 141-40) June 4. Johnson FOR.

1943-- Passage of second Anti-Strike Bill over veto (2/3 majority needed). Passed 244-108 (D 114-67; R 130-37) June 25; Johnson FOR.

1946-- Strike Control Bill. Provided for mediation and voluntary arbitration, civil suits for breach of contract by labor unions, court action to enjoin violent picketing, enforcement of cooling-off periods, penalties for boycotts and jurisdictional strikes, and exclusion of supervisory employees from collective bargaining rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Passed 258-155 (D 109-120; R 149-33) February 7. Johnson FOR.

1946-- Temporary Strike Control Bill. Included provision for drafting strikers into the armed services and was to remain in effect until six months after official termination of the war. Passed 306-13 (D 157-8; R 148-4) May 25. Johnson FOR.

1947-- Passage of Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Bill over veto. Veto over-riden 331-83 (R 225-11; D 106-71) June 20. Johnson FOR.

1949-- Amendment to grant President power to seek injunctions and to seize plants in national emergency strikes. Adopted 50-40 (D 17-35; R 33-5) June 28. Johnson FOR.


1958-- Require employers to sign non-Communist affidavits, in order to gain access to the NLRB, and requiring a similar Taft-Hartley requirement for union officers. Agreed to 66-20 (D 30-17; R 36-3) June 16. Johnson FOR.

1959 McClellan "Bill of Rights" amendment to protect union members against unfair actions by their unions. Agreed to 47-46 (D 15-44; R 32-2) April 22. Johnson AGAINST.

1959-- Bar organizational or recognition picketing where a majority of employees has not sought recognition of the union and impose criminal penalties for "skatedown" picketing. Rejected 41-50 (D 16-43; R 26-7) April 24; Johnson AGAINST.

1959-- Require secret ballot strike votes before any strike could take place. Rejected 28-60 (D 12-46; R 16-14) April 24. Johnson PAIRED FOR.

1959-- Senate-House compromise labor reform bill, including provisions of Landrum-Griffin and Kennedy-Ervin bills. Agreed to 95-2 (D 62-1; R 20-12) August 17. Johnson AGAINST.
1960--Reduce proposed increases in minimum-wage coverage from 5 million to 280,000 additional persons. Rejected 39-56 (D 19-44; R 20-12) August 17. Johnson AGAINST.

1960--Raise minimum wage to $1.25 and extend coverage to 4 million additional workers. Passed 62-34 (D 47-16; R 15-18) August 18. Johnson FOR.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE

1939--Townsend $200-a-month old-age pension plan. Defeated 97-302 (D 40-194; R 55-107) June 1. Johnson AGAINST.

1950--Social Security Expansion Bill. Amendment to increase the wage base to $4,200. Rejected 36-45 (D 27-18; R 9-27) June 20. Johnson FOR.

1952--Boost Social Security benefits by 10 percent rather than 7 percent. Rejected 32-53 (D 26-20; R 6-33) August 16. Johnson FOR.


PUBLIC WORKS AND POWER

1948--TVA Steam Plant Bill. Amendment to appropriate $4 million for starting the proposed new steam generating plant for TVA. Rejected 186-201 (D 154-14; R 30-187) June 19. Johnson PAIRED FOR.

1950--River-Harbor Appropriation Reduction. Amendment to the omnibus appropriation bill to cut the fund for the river-harbor-flood control projects in half from $728 million to $364 million. Rejected 28-47 (D 7-35; R 21-12) July 27. Johnson AGAINST.

1954--Authorize federal atomic power program; give preference to public bodies in excess power disposal. Agreed to 45-41 (D 38-6; R 6-35) July 22; Johnson FOR.


1959--Kill the TVA self-financing bill. Rejected 17-73 (D 2-56; R 15-17) July 9. Johnson AGAINST.

1959--Cut public works appropriation about $80 million to figure recommended by President. Rejected 17-72 (D 5-52; R 12-20) July 9; Johnson AGAINST.

CONSERVATION AND RESOURCES

1948--Tidelands Oil Bill. Establish title of states to submerged lands off their shores and all natural resources within their boundaries. Passed 257-29 (D 94-21; R 163-7) April 30. Johnson FOR.

1952--Tidelands leases (S J Res 20). Confirm and establish title of the states to tidelands and their resources. Agreed to 50-35 (D 24-24; R 26-11) April 2. Johnson FOR.


AID TO EDUCATION

1946--Permanent School Lunch Program. Authorize an annual appropriation of $50 million for distribution to states and cities which operate school lunch programs without discrimination on account of "race, color, creed, or national origin." Passed 276-101 (D 164-45; R 110-56) Feb. 21. Johnson FOR.

1949--Educational Finance Act of 1949. (S 246), providing $300 million a year for grants to states on a sliding scale to equalize educational opportunities. Passed 58-15 (D 36-3; R 22-12) May 5. Johnson FOR.

1958--Authorize annual grants of $1 billion for two years for public school construction. Rejected 30-61 (D-23-24; R 7-37) Aug. 13 Johnson AGAINST.


1960--S 8, authorizing appropriations for school construction for two years of $20 per child of school age--about 917 million dollars a year. Passed 51-34 (D 42-12; R 9-22) Feb. 4. Johnson FOR.

FARM POLICY

1937--Passage of second bill to continue reduced interest rates on government loans to farmers, over veto (two-thirds majority required). Passed 260-98 (D 189-90; R 62-7). July 13. Johnson FOR.

1938--Work Relief-Recovery Bill. Amendment to increase by $100 million funds for Rural Electrification. Adopted 260-139 (D 203-97; R 44-42) June 14. Johnson FOR.

1953--Reduce funds for the Agriculture Conversation Program by $50 million. Rejected 22-51 (D 6-32; R 16-19) June 15. Johnson AGAINST.

1954--Price supports for five basic crops on a flexible scale ranging from 82.5 to 90 per cent of parity in 1955. Passed 49-44 (D 10-35; R 39-8) Aug. 9. Johnson AGAINST.

1956--Delete provisions of farm bill calling for return to 90 per cent of parity price supports. Passed 54-41 (D 13-35; R 41-6) March 8. Johnson AGAINST.

FARM POLICY--continued:

1956--Require farmers to put a certain amount of their land into the soil bank in order to receive price supports. Passed 48-46 (D 12-37; R 36-9) March 19. Johnson AGAINST.

1956--Passage of bill providing 90 per cent of parity price supports for one year and establishing soil bank. Passed 50-35 (D35-4; R 11-35) Johnson ANNOUNCED FOR.

1958--Bar indefinitely any reductions in price supports or acreage allotments for any farm commodity. Passed 50-43 (D 39-8; R 11-35) March 13. Johnson FOR.

1964--Administration farm bill. Amendment imposing import quotas on fresh, chilled, or frozen beef, veal, mutton or lamb at a level equal to the average imports of the product from 1958 to 1962; and giving the President discretion to increase the quota at a rate equal to the nation's population growth, to impose quotas on imports of meat in other forms, and to set maximum limits on the amounts of meat which could be brought through individual U.S. ports of entry. Rejected 44-46 (D 20-42; R 24-4) March 5. President Johnson OPPOSED.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT

1938--Motion to discharge the House Judiciary Committee from further consideration of an constitutional amendment to provide for a popular referendum prior to any exercise by Congress of its power to declare war. Rejected 188-209 (D 111-188; R 64-21) Jan 10. Johnson AGAINST.

1939--The Hatch Act. Restrict the political activities of Federal employees. Passed 241-134 (D 82-133; R 157-0). July 20. Johnson AGAINST.

1941--Hatch Act Amendment. Extend restrictions to political activity of certain employees of state, county and municipal agencies that are Federally financed. Passed 243-122 (D 89-120; R 152-1) July 10. Johnson AGAINST.

1954--Constitutional Amendment guaranteeing 18-year-olds the right to vote. (two thirds majority required) Rejected 48-37 (R 27-0; D 7-24) May 21. Johnson AGAINST.

1956--Constitutional amendment to give each state a choice between a proportional division of its Presidential elector votes or choosing electors by Congressional district. Rejected 48-37 (D 26-18; R 22-19) (two thirds vote required) March 27. Johnson FOR.

1956--Establish joint Congressional committee to supervise CIA activities. Rejected 27-59 (D 19-21; R 8-38) April 11. Johnson AGAINST.

1958--Kill bill to provide that no act of Congress should be construed as nullifying state laws on the same subject unless Congress so specified or the two cannot be reconciled. Motion adopted 41-40 (D 27-17; R 14-23) Aug. 21. Johnson FOR.

IMMIGRATION

1952--Immigration and Nationality Act (Walter-McCarren Act.) Passage of bill over veto (two thirds majority required) Passed 57-26 (D 25-18; R 32-8) June 27. Johnson FOR.
INTERNAL SECURITY, EXTREMISM

1943--Extension of Dies Committee Investigation of Un-American Activities for two years. Adopted 302-94 (D 121-78; R 180-13) Feb. 10. Johnson FOR.

1947--Movie Contempt Citations. Charged 10 Hollywood writers with contempt for refusing to tell the Un-American Activities Committee whether they were Communists. Passed 346-17 (D 137-15; R 209-1) Nov. 24. Johnson FOR.


1950--Passage of Internal Security Act over veto. (two thirds majority required). Passed 57-10 (D 26-10; R 31-0) Sept. 23. Johnson FOR.


1957--Restrict use of FBI files by defendants in criminal cases, thus limiting the effects of the Supreme Courts' Jenck's Decision. Conference report adopted 74-2 (D 39-1; R 35-1) Aug. 30. Johnson FOR.

1959--Kill bill to eliminate loyalty oath requirements for students seeking federal educational funds. Agreed to 49-42 (D 26-34; R 23-8) July 23. Johnson FOR.

CIVIL RIGHTS

1937--Anti-lynching bill. Passed 277-120 (D 189-117; R 75-3) April 15. Johnson AGAINST.

1940--Anti-lynching bill. Passed 252-131 (D 109-123; R 140-80) Jan. 10. Johnson AGAINST.

1942--Anti-Poll Tax Bill. Passed 254-84 (D 125-80; R 126-4) Oct. 13. Johnson AGAINST.

1943--Anti-Poll Tax Bill. Passed 265-110 (D 92-93; R 169-17) May 25. Johnson AGAINST.

1945--Anti-Poll Tax Bill. Passage making a poll tax unlawful as a qualification for voting in Federal elections. Passed 251-105 (D 118-86; R 131-19) June 12. Johnson AGAINST.

1946--School Lunch Bill. Amendment denying funds under the act to "any state or school, if in carrying out its functions under this title, it makes any discrimination because of race...." Accepted 258-110 (D105-99; R 152-10) February 10. Johnson AGAINST.

1946--Motion to adjourn to prevent floor action on the FEPC bill. Rejected 97-199 (D 66-76; R R 31-122) July 10. Johnson FOR.

1947--Anti-Poll Tax bill. Passage of bill prohibiting payment of poll tax as a qualification in federal elections. Passed 290-112 (D 73-98; R 216-14) July 21 Johnson AGAINST.
1948--Southern States Education Compact. Congressional approval of 15 southern states to establish regional universities for colored and later for white students, opposed by NAACP as a device to perpetuate segregation. Approved 236-45 (D 87-31; R 149-12) May 4. Johnson FOR.

1949--Cloture rule. Amendment to the cloture rule which would enable two-thirds of the members voting to impose cloture on any matter except changes in the Senate rules. Rejected 29-57 (D 17-27; R 12-30) March 17. Johnson AGAINST.

1949--Cloture rule. Amendment which would permit cloture on all matters, including Senate rules, by a constitutional majority (49 Senators). Rejected 17-69. (D 13-31; R 4-38) March 17. Johnson AGAINST.

1949--Cloture rule. Amendment which would make cloture applicable to all business except proposals to change the rules, by a vote of two-thirds of the total Senate membership. (A so-called "compromise" the amendment was backed by a Republican-Southern Democratic coalition and actually made cloture more difficult to impose than had previously been the case.) Passed 63-23. (D 29-15; R 34-8) March 17. Johnson FOR.

1949--National Housing Act of 1949. Amendment prohibiting discrimination or segregation under the act because of race, color or creed. Rejected 31-49 (D3-41; R28-8) April 21. Johnson AGAINST.

1949--Federal Aid to Education. Amendment to prohibit segregation in administration of the act. Rejected 16-65 (D 0-48; R 16-17) May 3. Johnson AGAINST.

1950--FEPC amendment. Motion to table FEPC amendment to the bill repealing the tax on oleomargarine. Agree to 59-17 (D 44-0; R 15-16) Johnson FOR.

1950--Anti-lynch amendment. Motion to table anti-lynch amendment to the bill repealing the tax on oleomargarine. Agreed to 50-20 (D45-1; R15-19) Jan. 18. Johnson FOR.

1950--Poll Tax Amendment. Motion to table anti-poll tax amendment to the bill repealing tax on oleomargarine. Agreed to 59-17 (D44-0; R15-17) Jan. 18. Johnson FOR.

1950--Armed Forces segregation. Amendment to the draft extension bill, which would provide for segregation if a majority of draftees and enlistees in 36 states expressed such a preference after 6 months operation of the law. Rejected 27-45 (D24-16; R3-29) June 22. Johnson FOR.

1950--Cloture. Invoke cloture on motion to take up FEPC bill (64 "yeas" required) Rejected 55-33 (D 22-27; R 33-6) July 12. Johnson AGAINST.

1950--Railway Labor Act. Motion to table amendment to the Railway Labor Act which would have denied the provisions of the act to labor organizations that segregated or excluded minorities. Agreed to 64-17 (D 41-0; R 23-17) Dec. 11. Johnson FOR.

1953--Cloture rule. Motion to table motion to consider adoption of Senate rules for the 83rd Congress; the motion was preliminary to an attempt to modify Rule XXII to facilitate the imposition of cloture and limitation of debate. Agreed to 70-21 (D 41-5; R29-15) Jan. 7. Johnson FOR.
1956—Civil Rights bill. Motion to adjourn for five minutes in order that there be
a morning hour, a parliamentary move to bring the civil rights bill to the floor.
Rejected 6-76 (D 3-39; R 3-37) July 24. Johnson AGAINST.

1957—Cloture rule. Motion to table motion to consider adoption of Senate Rules for
the 85th Congress. The motion was preliminary to an attempt to modify Rule XXII to
facilitate the imposition of cloture and the limitation of debate. Agreed to 55-38
(D 27-21; R 28-17) Jan. 4. Johnson FOR.

1957—Civil Rights Act of 1957. Anderson (D, N-M) Aiken (R, Vt.) amendment to elim-
inate Section 121 of Part III of the bill to permit the Attorney General to institute
civil action for the protection of civil rights under the 14th Amendment only when
ordered to do so by the President. Accepted 52-38 (D 34-13; R 18-25) July 24.
Johnson FOR.

1957—Civil Rights Act of 1957. Passage of the bill. Passed 72-18 (D29-18; R 43-0)
Aug. 7. Johnson FOR.

1959—Cloture rule. Motion to adjourn to the next day to prevent motion from being
made to consider the adoption of new Senate rules. Agreed to 73-23 (D 50-13; R 23-10)
Jan. 7. Johnson FOR.

1959—Cloture rule. Amendment to a proposal to revise rule XXII. The amendment would
enable three-fifths of the Senators voting to shut off debate, instead of two-thirds
as proposed by the original proposal. Rejected 36-58. (D 24-38; R 12-20) Jan. 12.
Johnson AGAINST.

1959—Cloture rule. Vote on resolution which would enable two-thirds of the Senators
voting to impose cloture on any matter. Passed 72-22 (D 44-19; R 28-3) Jan. 12.
Johnson FOR.

1960—Passage of S J Res 39, a constitutional amendment which would bar poll tax
or property qualifications as qualifications for voting in Federal elections. Adopted
70-18. (D 43-16; R 27-6) Feb. 2. Johnson FOR.

1960—Civil Rights proposals. Johnson (D, Texas) motion to table Case (R, S*D)
amendment to the pending bill to add Part III, empowering the Attorney General to
seek injunctions to protect any civil right. Tabling motion agreed to 55-38. (D 34-
28; R 21-10) March 10, Johnson FOR.

1960—Civil Rights Proposals. Douglas (D, Ill.)—Javits (R, NY) motion to limit debate
by invoking cloture on the civil rights filibuster (two-thirds majority required)
Rejected 42-53 (D 30-33; R 12-20), March 10. Johnson AGAINST.

1960—Civil Rights Act of 1960. Passage of the amended bill making obstruction of
all federal court orders a crime, outlawing all bombings and bomb threats, require-
ing preservation of voting records, providing for the court registration of Negroes,
and other matters. Passed 71-18 (D 42-18; R 29-0) April 8. Johnson FOR.

1964—Civil Rights Act of 1964. Mansfield (D, Mont) motion that the Senate take up
the bill. Agreed to 67-17 (D 41-17; R 26-0) March 26; President Johnson IN FAVOR.
CIVIL RIGHTS--continued

1964—Thurmond (D.S.C.) amendment to delete Title IV the Attorney General's authority to file suits to desegregate schools. Rejected 15-74 (D 15-45; R 0-29) June 16. President Johnson OPPOSED.

1964—Passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Passed 73-27 (D 46-21; R 27-6) June 19. President Johnson IN FAVOR.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

1938—Naval Expansion Bill. Included provision for 950 additional airplanes, with the total program estimated to cost $1 billion over six to eight years. Passed 294-100 (D 262-31; R 30-57) March 21, Johnson FOR.

1939—Motion to strike out $5 million authorization for harbor works, hangars, shops and barracks at Guam from the naval base authorization bill. Adopted 205-168. (D 64-152; R 138-15) Feb. 23. Johnson AGAINST.


1941—Selective Service Act. Passed 263-149 (D 211-33; R 52-112) Sept 7. Johnson FOR.


1953—Increase Air Force funds for aircraft purchases by $400 million. Rejected 38-55 (D 37-9; R 0-46) July 23. Johnson FOR.

1954—Increase by $350,466,000 defense appropriations for army personnel and maintenance. Rejected 38-50 (D 37-10; R 1-40) June 17. Johnson FOR.

1955—Increase Marine Corps funds by $46 million. Agreed to 48-40 (D 43-3; R 3-37) June 20. Johnson FOR.

1956—Increase Air Force procurement funds by $800 million. Agreed to 48-40 (D 43-3; R 5-37) June 26. Johnson AGAINST.

1959—Limit draft extension to two years, rather than four. Rejected 24-67 (D 16-43; R 8-24) March 11. Johnson AGAINST.

1959—Symington amendment to increase Army procurement funds from $1,450,000,000 to $1,683,900,000 and designate $453 million of the total for modernizing Army combat equipment. Rejected 43-48 (D 40-19; R 3-29) July 13. Johnson FOR.

#######

prepared with the assistance of Sue Daly and Viki Jardenas